content-image
00

We need to be open

Claude Muller certainly imagined the last phase of his career to be different when he took over the project management of the remediation of the former lindane factory Ugine Kuhlmann in Huningue, close to the Novartis Campus in Basel, about 10 years ago. What would become the toughest period of his career was also one of his most successful.

The interview was conducted by Goran Mijuk, photos by Gregory Collavini

scroll-down
Home
en
de
zh
jp
Share
Share icon
content-image
Enter fullscreen

Published on 01/07/2021

Claude Muller can look back on a long and successful career at Novartis, where he held a series of leadership and project management roles, from engineering, through finance to quality control. His down-to-earth style, calm demeanor and natural humility won him praise from his colleagues and the trust of his seniors, who tasked him with helping build the Novartis Campus in Basel at the turn of the millennium.

The Campus project, which served as a blueprint for many companies around the world to build state-of-the-art workplaces fit for the 21st century, would seem to be the natural culmination and a towering highlight of any career. But the trained computer engineer from the French border region in Alsace never thought he would spend nearly a decade overseeing the remediation of a former chemical factory site and turn into a sought-after expert when it comes to handling the chemical compound lindane, which until the 1970s was used as an insecticide.

The lindane remediation project not only became his biggest professional challenge and in many ways his greatest personal success. The complex and truly unique nature of the undertaking, which started out in the wake of water treatment regulation changes in Europe before turning into a fully-fledged remediation project around 2012, also took him on an emotional roller-coaster ride for which he seemed unprepared at times – and at one point he was even ready to throw in the towel.

When I met Claude Muller last summer, as the remediation neared its close, he was relaxed and ready to discuss the many lessons he learned between 2012 and 2019. “There were very difficult times during this long and complex project,” Muller said, when we sat down for an hour-long interview in the spaceship-like control room of the MS Vera Pax.

This ship, one of the longest and most modern working the Rhine these days, transported some of the last deliveries of lightly contaminated lindane waste in its bulky hull to the Netherlands, where the material was burned under high temperatures. “Now, as only a few tonnes of waste are waiting to be disposed of, I can start to feel relaxed and look back on this long and winding road.”

Almost the entire remediation team was on the MS Vera Pax that day to celebrate their achievements, chat about the challenges and pitfalls of lindane remediation and what future teams could learn from their experience. Most of all, the team members enjoyed a few days off in the early summer heat: cherishing the beautiful view of the lush riverbanks of the Rhine, grilling on the spacious deck of the ship and sipping an occasional beer during the journey, which took them from Basel to a water gate near Strasbourg, where the team stayed overnight.

The difficulty and protracted execution of the project, Muller says, were due to the roots and complex history of the site: French chemical producer Ugine Kuhlmann had manufactured lindane for many years until the manufacturing site, which adjoins the global headquarters of Novartis, closed in the 1970s. Then, Novartis predecessor company Sandoz bought the space to build its water treatment facility STEIH, short for Société pour le traitement des eaux industrielles de Huningue. STEIH was responsible, among others, for manag-ing the wastewater for Sandoz’s St. Johann site, which was later transformed into the Novartis Campus.

When water treatment regulation was about to be changed in Europe around 2010, Novartis decided to move its wastewater management to a new facility and discontinue STEIH. As part of this process, Novartis also volun-teered to clear up the site, a decision that was well intentioned but, in hindsight, not entirely well prepared. “Given what was known at the time, maybe it was impossible to be fully prepared,” Muller says.

“In hindsight, it is easy to criticize,” Muller says. “But it was the right decision at the time to remediate the site, even though Novartis was not legally bound to do so. Management decided to do it because it was the right thing to do.”

Novartis had years of experience in handling contaminated ground, and so it was natural that the company felt confident it would be able to tackle this challenge too. After an external study established the potential level of contamination, Novartis also made its own assessment, which was more conservative and was based on extensive drilling of the site. Once funding for the remediation was granted, work started in 2012.

But everything came to a grinding halt by September 2013. Although the decontamination work was executed under confinement under special tents, some of the material was released into the environment, causing public alarm when an unpleasant odor filled the air around the site. Regulators measuring the contamination in the vicinity, including the city of Basel, found lindane traces. Although the traces were within acceptable levels, the public outcry and media bashing was massive. Novartis decided to stop all work to investigate the incident and start anew.

For Claude Muller, who had taken over the project lead before the incident, it was the worst of times. Struggling to analyze the situation and managing the media fallout, he was fully aware that the remediation would not only require much more time, but necessitate a considerably higher budget and a complete strategic rethink.

The nerves of all those involved were on edge, and Muller concedes that at one point he had asked his direct bosses whether he should leave or not. But no one blamed him for the incident. He even won support from Chairman Joerg Reinhardt, who backed his call for a budget increase and signaled that Novartis should remediate the site within a working culture that is both collaborative and transparent.

“After the incident in September 2013, we saw a real change in how we handled the situation,” Muller said. “We had the backing of the Board of Directors to do everything we could to handle the remediation in the best possible way. This was a real turning point. We started to communicate more openly and reset the entire structure and contracted a new remediation specialist.”

After all the ups and downs, Claude Muller has not lost his appetite for project management. Quite the contrary: As we passed the Swiss-French border on board the MS Vera Pax and as he talked about his love of Alsace, its people and culture, Muller said that he would like to use his project management skills to support his hometown of Guebwiller. He aims to support the city in its goal to develop its urban and environmental attractiveness and become a tourist highlight in the region. Given his extensive background in leading complex and lengthy projects, Guebwiller can expect a welcome know-how boost and close the gap on other famous towns in the region.

content-image
Enter fullscreen

Mr. Muller, September 2013 was a pivotal time in your career. This was when remediation on the STEIH site was stopped following the release of some lindane material into the environment.

It was back in September 2013 when we had reports of unpleasant smells from the neighborhood. At the beginning, we could not fully understand the reason for this. But our measurements showed that material had escaped. Our mea-surements and those of the city of Basel showed that lindane levels were within acceptable levels and caused no health hazard. Nevertheless, we decided to halt the entire project and undertake a full investigation.

What was your personal reaction to it?

It was immediately clear to me that the project, in its current form, was doomed. What is the task of a project manager? You want to ensure that you achieve your deadline, meet your costs and reach your goal in time. That’s it. So, if a project is stopped, you know perfectly well that this will increase costs and that you will not be able to deliver on time. That’s a bad feeling. But I still believed halting the project was the right decision to take.

Why?

As a pharmaceuticals company, our mission is to improve and extend people’s lives. Under no circumstances can we allow people to be in danger, not even when the risk is low. So, for us it was key to guarantee the safety of everyone who lived and worked in the vicinity of the site.

What happened after the remediation project was put on hold?

After we stopped the project, we immediately contacted the relevant authorities in France and Switzerland and commissioned a new company to do another assessment of the site and to evaluate the project from scratch. During the reassessment period, we also put new structures in place to allow all relevant stakeholders to be part of the remediation process.

What other elements changed after the project was stopped?

What happened in the ensuing days, weeks and months after the project was halted, was almost a complete U-turn, especially in terms of culture. We started o communicate very openly about the state of the remediation project. We built a dedicated website with all relevant information and timely updates. We allowed for on-site visits for the press and other important stakeholders. We held very open discussions with management and the Board of Directors about the execution and financing of the project.

When did the project start to get traction again?

Once we started to work closely with remediation specialists Marti, Züblin and ERM, I started to feel more confident about the realization of the project. But the real cultural highlight for me was when we discussed the topic with Chairman Joerg Reinhardt. He was not only supportive to execute the project in the best possible manner. He also trusted us that we are capable of turning the project around. When we had to approach him to increase the budget, he was supportive because we were able to explain the urgency and importance of our request.

content-image
Enter fullscreen

Now, as the project is closing, what is the main lesson you’ve learned from the past few years?

I think one of the main lessons I’ve learned is that we did not do enough to evaluate the historical data. Yes, we did drillings and a lot of preparatory work, which was in line with general standards. But we did not do a thorough analysis of the historical usage of the site. Of course, we knew that Ugine Kuhlmann had been active on the site for many years and that the water remediation site STEIH was built on the same site. What escaped us was the fact that, when the old factory was destroyed to make room for the wastewater treatment plant, the lindane waste was not professionally managed and was buried all over the location. A thorough analysis of the historical data may have unearthed this and helped us realize that the remediation would have to be executed in a different way.

Can you name other key lessons learned?

I think the team spirit is absolutely decisive. In the weeks and months after the surprise halt in 2013, I felt insecure about the project’s future, as well as my own role. I discussed these concerns with my boss and even in this difficult time I found that I had the backing of my superiors and the support of the strong expertise of the project team. At the same time, the relation with the remediation specialists from Marti, Züblin and ERM was very strong. This helped us execute the project in a timely and professional fashion. Likewise, the adapted organizational setup of the project, which included important government stakeholders, also helped improve the execution of the project.

You also mentioned culture and transparency.

Right. Culture is the way we work together, what we expect of each other and how we treat each other. As the project progressed, Novartis itself went through a cultural change process, which gave more responsibility to associ-ates, shifting from a top-down approach to a less hierarchical system. This helped everyone involved to speak up and to point to real problems instead of glossing over challenges no one wanted to hear. The fact that we opened up to the press was also important. We were aware of the responsibility towards the public. This helped us in a way to redouble our efforts.

What is your recommendation to other teams that will work on similar lin­dane remediation projects in future?

The key thing is really to do a thorough investigation of the historical use of a contaminated site, get familiar with this molecule and its derivatives and spend enough time to pick the right partners. At the same time, it is important to involve all relevant stakeholders in the project structure early on and communicate clearly to the public. In the past, remediation was often simply regarded as specialist work. Public stakeholders were often ignored, because specialists prefer just to concentrate on their task. In today’s social environment, this attitude is wrong, and we need to collaborate across industries and public sectors in order to be successful. That’s the responsibility we have towards society. In a nutshell, we need to open up. The successful remediation of the STEIH site is a proof of concept for this cultural change.

The interview with Claude Muller first appeared in 2021 in the special edition of the Novartis LIVE-Magazine "Difficult, but right". You can order the publication here.

icon

Home
en
de
zh
jp
Share
Share icon